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TITLE (Include Security
We have little time in DOD to settle our in-house parochial matters.
Soon after the elections come to a close, we should not be surprised at more decisive congressional action on the defense appropriations, and thus, on force structure.
Focus
In this paper, I will examine a relevant dimension of the AC/RC mix dispute--the role of National Guard combat maneuver units. I chose to focus on combat maneuver units (Armor and Infantry fighting units with a mission to close with and destroy the enemy) for four primary reasons:
1) Throughout our nation's history, Army National Guard combat units have rarely been employed in their federal role properly during war or conflict.
Yet even today, "Eglenerally speaking, the Army National Guard is charged with combat missions...,"5 I will explore why we have done this,-and why this situation is likely to continue.
2) The Desert Shield/Storm controversy over the readiness and efficacy of National Guard combat maneuver "roundout" units has sent a signal to strategic planners. 6 The signal may have been misinterpreted. This needs to be cleared up in the context of future force structure requirements.
3) The Base Force envisages the need for a "go-it-alone" AC corps to respond quickly and decisively to regional contingencies. National Guard combat maneuver units, in particular, would be omitted from the crisis response role of such a corps (though Guard "roundup" maneuver units could later reinforce AC units already deployed to a crisis area).7 4) Finally, there are indications that the above three issues may be contributing toward the emergence of self-serving attitudes and a renewed rift between AC regulars and RC citizen soldiers.
This phenomenon has occurred just before and after every war or major conflict we have had. 8 We must understand the nature of this tendency and reverse it.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND American Military Tradition Has Roots in Medieval Europc
By the end of the tenth century, basic European medieval military organization had taken form and remained functionally in tact through the seventeenth century.
A recurring pattern of military need within kingdoms gave rise to a tripartite division of military responsibilities. In essence, each king would raise and pay a professional army (known as "housecarls"), which would be reinforced as necessary with enrolled militia (the "select fryd"), and finally, if needed in last ditch defense from invaders, unenrolled militia (the "great fryd") would be employed. 9 The housecarls were quartered in the king's castle and were frequently mounted, provided with armor and distinctive uniforms, and were employed in battle directly by the king. Often, housecarls were mercenaries. They had an additional mission to provide training to the select fryd who were productive and respected farmers, merchants, smiths, and craftsmen of the kingdom. Housecarls of today would most resemble the regular army.
Members of the select fryd gave numerical force to a king, but they were called to duty only when needed or to train for brief periods. They provided their own weapons, and usually only the officers were mounted. The state of training and will of the select fryd members to perform their duties nearly always meant the difference between victory or defeat during conflict among kingdoms. It is uncanny that the modern military structure most like the select fryd is called the Selected Reserve (the largest subcategory of the enrolled Ready Reserve)10
When the homeland was threatened and all available manpower was needed to repel an opposing force, the great fryd was pressed into service. These were the remainder of all able-bodied men within a kingdom from ages fifteen to sixty.
Though largely undisciplined, unequipped and untrained, the great fryd was often used as a source to bolster the ranks of the select fryd. The necessity to raise an army for the Revolutionary War, along with the desire to rely on militia for security during times of peace, caused the framers uf our Constitution to specifically provide for both requirements. Article I, Further, the need for all units to be on active duty lent to the loss of the National Guard's militia identity, except on paper, throughout the duration of the war.
In other words, to the National Guard, the massive national mobilization eventually meant that they were treated in the same way as any regular unit.
Ranks were filled by volunteers or draftees and in short order there was little connection to the unit's State or hometown.
After the WWII victory, General Marshall's directives for the reserves were eventually carried out. The National Guard Bureau and NGA were tacitly in favor of the post-war changes which put units back together in better organized and equipped Table of After policy and statutory adjustments stemming from the Korea War, the National Guard was satisfied that it would retain an important role in providing an adequately trained force to back up the regular army against any foreseeable threat to national security.26
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In the ensuing transitory years, the Army National Guard went through a period of change and reorganization where divisions were organized into a Additional Guard divisions were alerted to be ready for early call to active duty.
The entire need for so much as this minor, partial mobilization was challenged immediately on the floors of both houses of Congress. It became at once controversial.
With these doubts as sounding-boards, a few self-serving politicians emitted the plaintive wail that the young manhood of their States were being burdened with the duty of all.29
Paradoxically, this was one of the few periods in American history that the Guard was truly in harmony with its constitutional existence and the security requirements of the nation.
The call up represented '...the first use of reserve forces as an instrument of diplomacy, in this case a demonstration of national resolve intended to prevent a war rather than fight one.*30 But, when federalized by integral units in 1961--something the Guard had only hoped would happen in so many previous saber-rattling situations--"foul' cried the very politicians that had enabled the Guard to achieve its critical role in our national security' The
Guard's own source of political strength became its biggest liability. Even more importantly, many disturbing mobilization shortcomings were discovered during the build-up.
While the reserves were engaged in repairing the problems discovered and 
16
The Total-Force Policy Emerges
As we began to pay more attention to our NATO commitments, we saw that the Thus, given the ensuing downsizing of AC forces, the DOD also recognized that a symbiotic relationship between AC and RC units would be critical to a Cold War national security strategy. The total-force policy seemed to put the legislative and executive branches in synch with one another, and it would significantly improve the understandings and working relationshi.ps between AC and RC units.
Then too, General Abrams' 'roundout" idea would give National Guard combat units a unique role in the total-force.
Recapitulation
The National Guard's past is filled with turmoil and triumph, disappointment and delight, but surprisingly little combat as an integral force. The risk taken was apparently worth it.
We all know what happened to the Though the young leaders and soldiers were pulling along okay, many of the senior NCOs and too many of the senior officers in the 155th Brigade had made up their minds that they were only mobilized for the regular army to make them look unprepared, untrained, and unwilling to go to war. Many Guardsmen truly believed that they were the subjects 25 of a cruel plot to undermine the roundout concept.
Though they had some very important and provable points regarding double standards (from previous RA evaluations they had received), equipment mismatches, and the overbearing RA presence, the RA trainers took their mission to heart--they were training men to go to war; standards had to be achieved.
That's what it boiled down to. No one was going to certify a soldier, squad, team, tank crew, section, platoon, or company until they were ready to go to war.58
The shortcomings and problems of the roundout brigades very quickly became newsworthy and political. Numerous investigations developed from the Army Inspector General's (IG) Office, The General Accounting Office (GAO), from
State-level agencies, and from US Congressional staffs. Testimony on this subject also abounds in the records of congressional hearings.59
With an allowance for the occasional, unavoidable battle between personalities, the allegations and counterallegations between senior regulars and reservists were basically aimed at one target--readiness.
Were the brigades going to be combat ready enough to go to war, or not?
Much was at stake for the activated brigades, but much was at stake for the regular army too. Under the total-force policy, the regular army had been Ready Guard combat units were a strategic necessity.
To be sure, politics were somewhat to blame for the elevated ratings; but, so were more objective factors such as a lack of a sophisticated evaluation and rating system. For example, training performances evaluated against Ar~my standards were often evaluated under varying and constrained conditions (e.g., a dwarfed tank gunnery range at Camp Shelby cannot possibly test tank crew skills to the extent that they can be tested at the more expansive and up-to-date ranges at Fort Hood).61
Let's be forthright though. From a pragmatic perspective, the most poignant criticism of National Guard combat maneuver units is that the training time available to Guardsmen annually is just not enough for them to achieve the required level of combat readiness to deploy on short notice. With few exceptions, this will remain an insurmountable challenge for Guard units as long as they must deploy and be ready to fight in less than 90-120 days after There is a danger that the operational ranks within RC elements will view
Bold Shift as more proof that AC professionals just don't understand the time constraints, training challenges, and recruiting and retention issues faced by part-time citizen soldiers, particularly leaders. A backlash of recalcitrance from Bold Shift could further contribute to AC/RC animosities.
Of history, it has been said frequently and in many clever ways that, if we do not study and learn from it, we will be doomed to repeat it. This may be as much truth as cliche, but regarding the Desert Shield/Storm experience, anyone who claims that history has repeated itself for the reserves is drawing an invalid conclusion.
Granted, there are similarities between the Gulf War mobilization and earlier mobilization shortcomings, but there are infinitely more positive differences too. Remember; this was the first clearly successful large-scale RC mobilization/deployment. The success can and should be attributed to the total-force policy. And as to the fully modernized roundout brigades, they proved capable of being validated for deployment within 90-120 days after call up.
Following investigation of the entire affair in painstaking detail, by several chartered organizations, the Goldich CRS report concluded: "This is an unprecedented achievement, when compared to the previous historical experience of mobilizing National Guard combat units of brigade or division size. '66 Unfortunately, between the need to drastically and rather quickly downsize the force, and the proliferation of the well-documented AC/RC rift associated with the non-deployment of the roundout brigades to the Gulf War, the future role of National Guard combat maneuver units in the force structure has become a highly 31 charged political issue and debate.
Lobby groups tend to link DODs strategic "go-it-alone" corps rhetoric with the old constitutional debate over a well-regulated militia versus a standing army in time of peace. They protest that the "go-it-alone" corps is tantamount to supporting a needless and overpowerful large standing army; they reject the concept and want more, not less, RC given the forthcoming threat analysis and any changes to the National Security Strategy of the United States, the actual role of National Guard combat maneuver units in future force structure ought to be determined by the following three imperatives:
1) THE FIRST ORDER IS TO EXECUTE THE REQUIRED DOWNSIZING.
We just have to "*bite the bullet" on this issue, AC and RC alike. We must avoid confounding the options, and stop wasting-time and effort quarrelling within DOD over where and how deeply the cuts should be made. Cold War forces can no longer be justified; that includes over 800 RC units, many of which will be combat maneuver units.
And there is no hidden agenda on the part of the regulars (as has been implied by RC lobby groups) to "save" AC forces, at the expense of RC forces, by restructuring certain regular army units into a virtually self-supporting, AC "go-it-alone" crisis response corps. This is a legitimate strategic requirement. But it is being misread by legislators and RC personnel, many of whom see the proposal as a means for the Pentagon to sever reliance on RC forces in favor of retaining more AC units for national defense.
That is clearly not an accurate assessment. In fact, by 1995, RC forces will come down only to their 1979/80 strengths, but AC forces will shrink to pre-WWII levels. 71 
2)
KEEP NATIONAL GUARD COMBAT MANEUVER UNITS IN THE FORCE STRUCTURE. The total-force policy has demonstrated that this can work.
Once the total-army is properly downsized, and with the diligent application of Bold Shift initiatives, National Guard combat maneuver units will become important economy-of-force sources of mcdernly equipped and partially trained combat soldiers. National Guard combat maneuver units not assigned a roundout or roundup role should continue to affiliate and habitually train with a like AC unit whenever possible. We simply cannot afford to keep enough combat maneuver units activated--especially in the heavy forces--to respond to multiple contingencies or protracted conflict with only AC combat forces.
In this age of highly technical weapons systems and complex, lethal battlefields, the draft is not likely to expand our ranks with trained soldiers quickly enough.
National Guard combat maneuver units can be there in 120 days or less.
And when we do go to war (armed conflict more protracted than an initial crisis response operation) again, we need to avoid the mistake President Johnson made introducing troops into Vietnam.
We should heed the teachings of Clausewitz regarding the importance of political will to the outcome of military conflict.
Combat units deployed from across America will be an important barometer of the will of the people to wage war.
DO NOT assign RC units CSS roles exclusively, as suggested by some analysts.72
3)
CAPITALIZE ON EVOLUTIONARY STRENGTHS and DO NOT ABANDON THE ROUNDOUT/ROUNDUP CONCEPT.
Of course, we do not want to repeat historical mistakes.
We need to foster a cultural change that will close the dated rift between AC professionals and RC part-time citizen soldiers.73
But we also want to build on programs and policies that have worked, such as the total-force policy. As to the roundout program, under tough conditions it has survived its initiation rites.
I believe this country is producing a new breed of Guardsmen who are up to the challenge.
If we keep the expectations and the standards high, the roundout units will only get stronger and more mature.
We must give them full acceptance. Roundout is being studied to the nth degree; perhaps refinements are worth testing (e.g., battalion and/or company roundout units vice an entire brigade).
With the Bold Shift program providing the impetus, however, I believe that roundout units, as well as other National Guard Combat maneuver units, will provide this country with a cost effective strategic reserve capable of mobilizing for major contingencies or general war, and capable of achieving combat readiness within a reasonable amount of time to ensure our national security. This is, indeed, a time of great uncertainty in our country as well as throughout the world. Citizen soldiers serving in combat maneuver units are needed in our strategic reserves as much today as they ever have been. 
